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Cox v. MGM Grand Hotel, LCC., 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 27 (Apr. 14, 2022)1
Civil Procedure: Denial of New Trial in Personal Injury Action
Summary
This case addressed when the district court can and should grant a remand for a new trial
when a party claimed that evidentiary and instructional errors prejudiced their case. The
particular issue in this case was the admittance of six surveillance videos that contradicted incourt presentation.
Facts and Procedural History
Appellants, in this appeal from a judgment on a defense verdict, complained that the
district court’s evidentiary and instructional errors prejudiced their case. The appellants referred
particularly to the district court’s decision to admit six surveillance videos of appellant Gavin
Cox. These videos show Cox walking easily, without any assistance outside of court. In court,
Cox walked with assistance and these videos contradicted Cox’s in-court presentation. The
videos were used as impeachment-by-contradiction evidence, and the district court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting them. Appellants also claimed errors that the district court did not
adequately admonish defense counsel for improper statements during closing arguments, that the
district court misapprehended the record, etc. All of these arguments fell short according to the
Court. The Court concludes that most of the errors raised are left to the district court’s sound
discretion and none support that the district court abused its discretion in denying a new trial.
The Court affirmed.
Cox attended David Copperfield’s magic show located at the MGM Hotel. During the
performance, Copperfield asked for thirteen audience participants in the show’s “Lucky #13”
illusion. Cox volunteered and was selected. During the illusion, Cox fell doing the outdoor
portion of the runaround. Where and why Cox fell is under dispute, however, Cox testified that
the outdoor portion of the runaround was intermittently dark, then light. He testified that he
slipped on construction dust and fell while running as fast as he could up an unsafely sloped
ramp. Respondents and backstage employees maintain and presented evidence that the
employees guided participants through the route with lights, that they led the group on a “brisk
walk” or “light jog” and that the concrete was level. Experts presented by respondents believed
that Cox tripped, not slipped, when he failed to pick his foot up and caught his toe on the ground.
Cox sued David Copperfield individually and through his corporation, David
Copperfield’s Disappearing, Inc (Copperfield). He also sued MGM Grand Hotel, LLC,
Backstage, and Team Construction Management, Inc. (Team) for negligence, respondeat
superior, negligent hiring, training, and supervision, loss of consortium, and punitive damages.
Overall, Cox sought more than $1 million in damages from the traumatic brain, spine, and
shoulder injuries.
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The district court bifurcated the trial into two phases after reviewing respondent’s
motion. The two phases were liability and damages. The Coxes argued that bifurcation would
unfairly prevent them from explaining to the jury how Cox’s injuries have impacted him.2 The
district court then created a unique bifurcation order. The order generally precluded evidence
relating to medical or other damages to the first phase of trial. However, the order permitted the
Coxes to present evidence regarding the nature of the injuries claimed, specifically, “[w]hat Mr.
Cox alleges his injuries generally are and to establish that Mr. Cox may have less than a clear
recollection of the events on the night of the fall.” Cox told the court about his injuries and
visually presented himself to the jury as a person who needs assistance to walk. Cox used help to
go to and from the courthouse and to the witness stand. On cross-examination, Cox testified that
he also used assistance to walk when not in court.
Backstage moved to admit six 30-second videos into evidence of Cox walking normally
without physical assistance outside of court. The videos show Cox walking his dog on a leash,
with his wife, with his family on the way to trial, all unassisted. Despite the Coxes’ objections,
the court admitted the videos. Closing arguments focused on the discrepancies in the evidence.
The Coxes moved for judgment as a matter of law on respondents’ comparative negligence
defense. The district court denied their motion and instructed the jury on both negligence and
comparative negligence. The jury returned a special verdict finding that Backstage and Team
Construction were not negligent; that MGM and Copperfield were negligent but that their
negligence was not that proximate cause of Cox’s fall; and that Cox was comparatively negligent
and 100 percent the cause of his fall. The Coxes again moved for judgement as a matter of law
on respondents’ comparative negligence defense. Additionally, the Coxes moved for a new trial
under NRCP 59(a). The district court denied both motions and the Coxes appealed.
Discussion
The Coxes argued that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion for
a new trial under NRCP 59(a)(1).3 The Coxes asserted that the district court erred and prejudiced
their right to a fair trial when it (1) admitted the sub rosa videos, (2) did not adequately admonish
defense counsel for improper argument, (3) allowed the jury to consider comparative negligence,
(4) did not find that the jury manifestly disregarded the instructions in reaching its verdict, and
(5) did not tell the jury why it canceled the jury view. To be entitled to a new trial under NRCP
59(a)(1), the movant must establish grounds.4
The ability of the district court to, “admit or exclude evidence (is reviewed) for abuse of
discretion” and will not be disturbed “absent a showing of palpable abuse.”5 The district court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the videos as impeachment-by-contradiction evidence.
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The Court added that they did not consider the propriety of the bifurcation order because the Coxes do not raise it
as an issue on appeal.
3
See Gunderson v. D. R. Horton, Inc., 130 Nev. 67, 74, 319 P.3d 606, 611 (2014) (reviewing a district court’s
decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion.)
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NRCP 59(a)(1) (listing as grounds for granting a new trial), see also Pizarro-Ortega v. Cervantes-Lopez, 133 Nev.
261, 263-64, 396 P.3d 783, 786 (2017).
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“Impeachment by contradiction occurs when a party offers evidence to prove that a fact to which
a witness testified is not true.”6 The Coxes did not and do not dispute the video’s authenticity.
However, they make four distinct arguments why the district court should not have admitted
them: (1) the videos were not admissible to impeach Cox’s conduct because only sworn verbal
testimony is impeachable, (2) admitting the videos violated NRS 50.085(3) which prohibits the
introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove a witness’s bad character for truthfulness, (3) that the
videos were irrelevant to the liability phase of a bifurcated trial and therefore inadmissible
because collateral to the matter, and lastly (4) the district court abused its discretion in denying
their request to call a medical expert on rebuttal to explain why Cox walked differently in and
out of court.
The Coxes also argue that attorney misconduct during closing arguments entitled them to
a new trial under NRCP 59(a)(1)(B) and Lioce v. Cohen.7 Rule 3.4(e) of the Nevada Rules of
Professional Conduct (RPC) states that a “lawyer shall not…state a personal opinion as the
justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, or the culpability of a civil litigant.” The Coxes
argue that the counsel for Backstage, Copperfield, and MGM each made statements during
closing arguments that violated RPC 3.4(e). The Coxes failed to object to the comments at trial.8
The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding the admonishment sufficient. The
statements at issue were made by MGM’s lawyer, Popovich. Popovich stated that Cox has “been
manipulating this jury from day one with every move he made. You shouldn’t believe a word
that comes out of his mouth because the only reason to do that is the green box at the end. He
just wants a payoff.” These statements were improper because they asked the jury to step outside
the relevant facts and hold MGM not liable because Cox is a liar.9 Under the Lioce framework if
a party objects to attorney misconduct at trial, and the district court sustains the objection, it
should “admonish jury and counsel.”10 The parties presented the district court with a draft
admonishment that the Coxes either drafted or approved. The district court changed the word
“impermissible” to “the Court has sustained the objection.” The Coxes did not object to the
revision, however, they argue on appeal that the admonishment was insufficient because it did
not adequately and separately rebuke Popovich. The Court finds that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by finding the admonishment sufficient such that no new trial was needed.
The Coxes argue that the district court erred in how they instructed the jury on
comparative negligence and should have granted their motion for judgment as a matter of law,
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27 Charles A. Wright and Victor J. Gold, Federal Practice & Procedure § 6096, at 655 (2d ed. 2007).
“Under Lioce, this court decides whether there was attorney misconduct, identifies the applicable legal standard
for determining whether a new trial was warranted, and assesses whether the district court abused its discretion in
applying that standard.” See generally Gunderson, 130 Nev. at 74-75.
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error.”
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See Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, 125 Nev. at 364-65 (2009) (holding that attorney committed misconduct by
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7

striking comparative negligence as an affirmative defense. In Nevada, “issues of negligence are
properly resolved by a jury.”11 The same is true for an issue of comparative negligence.12 NRS
41.141 requires the district court to instruct the jury on comparative negligence on request of a
defendant when the issue is raised as a bona fide defense. Comparative negligence is a “bona
fide issue” when the evidence supports that it is a viable defense.13 Both parties produced
contradicting evidence. The Coxes pointed to MGM’s NRCP 30(b)(6) witness, Mark Habersack,
who testified that he was not aware of anything that Cox did wrong during the illusion. The
testimony was not conclusive; rather it is another piece of evidence for the jury to consider when
determining comparative fault.14 Respondents produced significant evidence to offset
Habersack’s testimony and showed that Cox may have acted unreasonably by running as fast as
he could, through allegedly dark corridors, without knowing where he was going, culminating in
a trip and fall. The Court concluded that respondents produced enough evidence to raise a bona
fide issue of Cox’s comparative negligence, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by
delivering NRS 41.141’s mandatory instruction. The district court properly denied the Coxes’
motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on these grounds.
Conclusion
The Court found that the jury did not disregard the court’s instructions or applicable law,
and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Coxes’ motion for a new trial on
these grounds.
At trial and in the presence of the jury, respondents moved for a jury view of the
runaround route, which the district court granted. The Coxes argued that they suffered prejudice
warranting a new trial. The Coxes also argued that the district court did not explain its reasoning
when it later canceled the jury view and therefore implied to the jury that the Coxes caused the
cancelation because they had something to hide. The Coxes did not object to the district court’s
cancelation of the jury view, ask the district court to explain to the jury why it canceled the jury
view, or otherwise raise the issue below. The Court therefore denied to address it in the first
instance.15 For the reasons above, the Court affirmed the district court’s judgement on the jury’s
special verdict for respondents and the district court’s order denying the Coxes’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.
Stiglich, J., with whom PARRAGUIRRE, C.J. agrees, dissenting.
Justice Stiglich and Justice Parraguirre both dissented. The Justices believed that the
district court abused its discretion by admitting sub rosa surveillance videos that were not
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relevant to liability and were barred by the collateral fact rule. The evidence should not have
been presented in the liability phase, rendering the outcome unfair. In light of the bifurcation, the
videos were not relevant to liability. The videos were barred by the collateral fact rule and the
improper admission of the sub rosa surveillance videos warranted a new trial.

